2019 Game theory and strategic interaction

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Project Details

Game theory and strategic interaction

 

Prof. Dr. Heiko Rauhut

PD Dr. Heinrich Nax

 

Lecture: Tuesdays, 10:15 – 12:00

 

Course outline:

This lecture gives an introduction to models of social interactions in the social sciences. A focus is on game theoretical models, actor models and models about micro-macro transitions. Typical examples and empirical findings from the social sciences are discussed.

 

Course Credits:

For BA students: The course is worth 4 ECTS credits. The course is not graded and is examined on a pass/fail basis.

For MA students: The course is worth 6 ECTS credits. The course is not graded and is examined on a pass/fail basis.

To receive credit, students are expected to read the literature, participate in group work and discussions during the lecture and pass the exam. The exam is written in the last session of the course. If the exam is not passed the course is failed. In this case, students are advised to take the course “Modellbildung” in the upcoming spring term 2020.

 

Core literature:

Diekmann, Andreas: Spieltheorie. Rowohlt 2009.

Further literature:

Dixit, Avinash K., and Susan Skeath. Games of Strategy. WW Norton & Company, 2015.

Braun, Norman & Gautschi, Thomas (2011), Rational Choice Theorie. Juventa; Weinheim, München.

Herbert Gintis (2000): Game Theory Evolving. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Ken Binmore (1992): Fun and Games. Lexington: Heath.

Eric Rasmusen (2000): Games and Information. 3.,veränderte Aufl., Oxford: Blackwell.

Camerer, Colin (2003): Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schelling, Thomas C.: Micromotives and macrobehavior. WW Norton & Company.

 

Course-relevant websites:

www.Gametheory.online

www.scienceexperiment.online

 

 

 

 

 

 

Syllabus

 

PART I: Introduction and Course credits

1

19.2.19

HR

Introduction

Course credits and introduction

PART II: Game Theory

2

26.2.19

HH

Practical exercise: Class room experiment on the beauty contest game

Literature:

  • Camerer, Colin F. Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton University Press, 2011. Chapter 1: Introduction, p. 1-24.
  • Selten, Reinhard, and Rosemarie Nagel. "Das Zahlenwahlspiel-Hintergründe und Ergebnisse." Spektrum der Wissenschaft, February (1998): 16-22.
  • Diekmann, Andreas. "Rational choice, evolution and the “Beauty Contest”. In: Raymond Boudon. A Life in Sociology. Oxford: Bardwell (2009).

3

5.3.19

HH

Cooperative vs noncooperative game theory

Literature:

  • Serrano, Roberto. Cooperative games: Core and Shapley value. No. 2007-11. Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics, 2007
  • Gale, David, and Lloyd S. Shapley. "College admissions and the stability of marriage." The American Mathematical Monthly 69.1 (1962): 9-15.

4

12.3.19

HH

Non-cooperative game theory: Normal form, Best replies, Nash equilibrium

Literature:

  • Nash, John. "Non-cooperative games." Annals of mathematics (1951): 286-295.

5

19.3.19

HH

Non-cooperative game theory: dynamics, Sub-game perfection

Literature:

  • Exercises and notes will be distributed.

 

6

26.3.19

HH

Experimental game theory, Behavioral game theory, Learning in games

Literature:

  • Camerer, Colin F. "Progress in behavioral game theory." Journal of economic perspectives 11.4 (1997): 167-188.

7

2.4.19

HR

Cooperation and punishment: Class experiment and discussion

Literature:

  • Fehr, Ernst, and Herbert Gintis. "Human motivation and social cooperation: Experimental and analytical foundations." Annu. Rev. Sociol. 33 (2007): 43-64.

8

9.4.19

HH

Bargaining, Markets

 

Literature:

  • Exercises and notes will be distributed.

 

PART III: Sociological applications and experiments

9

16.4.19

HR

Cooperation and punishment: Experimental evidence

Literature:

  • Chaudhuri, A. (2011). “Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature.” Experimental Economics, 14(1), 47-83.
  • Henrich, Joseph, et al. "Costly punishment across human societies." Science 312.5781 (2006): 1767-1770.
  • Herrmann, Benedikt, Christian Thöni, and Simon Gächter. "Antisocial punishment across societies." Science 319.5868 (2008): 1362-1367.

23.4.19

 

  • Easter break

10

30.4.19

HR

Normative conflict

Literature:

  • Winter, Fabian, Heiko Rauhut, and Dirk Helbing. "How norms can generate conflict: An experiment on the failure of cooperative micro-motives on the macro-level." Social Forces 90.3 (2012): 919-946.
  • Nikiforakis, Nikos, Charles N. Noussair, and Tom Wilkening. "Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement." Journal of Public Economics 96.9-10 (2012): 797-807.

11

7.5.19

HR

Lying, ignorance and social dynamics

Literature:

  • Rauhut, Heiko. "Beliefs about lying and spreading of dishonesty: Undetected lies and their constructive and destructive social dynamics in dice experiments." PloS one 8.11 (2013): e77878.
  • Abeler, J., D. Nosenzo, and C. Raymond (2016). “Preferences for truth-telling”. Working Paper. [Meta-analysis]
  • Gächter, Simon, and Jonathan F. Schulz. "Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies." Nature 531.7595 (2016): 496.

12

14.5.19

HR

Signaling

Literature:

  • Gambetta, Diego. "Signaling." The Oxford handbook of analytical sociology (2009): 168-194.
  • Rebecca Bliege Bird and Eric Alden Smith: "Signaling theory, strategic interaction, and symbolic capital." Current anthropology 46.2 (2005): 221-248.
  • Diekmann, Andreas, and Wojtek Przepiorka. "Soziale Normen als Signale: Der Beitrag der Signaling-Theorie." Soziologische Theorie kontrovers. Vol. 50. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010. 220-237.

PART IV: Exam

13

21.5.19

HR/HH

Questions & Answers, Discussion, further specialization

14

28.5.19

 

Exam

 


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